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Abstract 
TNF-alpha inhibitors represent one of the most important areas of biopharmaceuticals by sales, with three blockbusters 
accounting for 8 per cent of total pharmaceutical sale in Norway. Novelty of the paper is to examine, with the use of a 
unique natural policy experiment in Norway, to what extent the price responsiveness of prescription choices is affected 
when the identity of the third-party payer changes. The three dominating drugs in this market, Enbrel, Remicade, and 
Humira, are substitutes, but have had different and varying funding schemes - hospitals and the national insurance plan. 
A stochastic structural model for the three drugs, covering demand and price setting, is estimated in a joint maximum 
likelihood approach. We find that doctors are more responsive when the costs are covered by the hospitals compared to 
when costs are covered by national insurance. 
Keywords: pharmaceuticals, discrete choice model, funding-schemes. 
JEL-Code: C35, D43, I18, L11. 
1. Introduction 
The agency problem faced by insurance companies and governments, and its consequences for health care financing has 
been subjected to extensive theoretical and empirical research (McGuire, 2000). The moral hazard problem in health 
care arises due to third-party funding and doctors’ superior information about diagnosis and preferred treatment choices. 
In an insurance-based health care system there are at least two candidates for being the third-party payer. When 
prescribing a drug on behalf of an insured patient, the cost may be covered by traditional insurance plans – private or 
public – on a fee-for-service basis - or by the hospital with which the doctor and patient are affiliated. In Norway the 
main sources of health care financing are national (public) insurance plans and hospital budgets, financed with grants 
from the government. 
The agency problem differs between a global hospital funding scheme and a fee-for-service approach adopted by 
traditional insurance plans. Treatment costs covered by the national insurance plan do not represent a direct cost for the 
doctor and the hospital. To the extent that treatment costs still affect the choice of drug under a pure national insurance 
plan funding can be explained by doctors’ understanding and adherence to national guidelines for cost-effective 
treatment choices. However, when treatment costs are covered by the hospital, the opportunity costs becomes more 
“tangible” to the doctors. Increased treatment costs on one patient reduce available resources for other activities at the 
affiliated hospital. For this reason, treatment choices may be under a tighter control or monitoring when costs are 
covered by the local hospital instead of a national, and tax funded, insurance plan. 
With use of a unique natural policy experiment in Norway, we are able to investigate to what extent the price 
responsiveness of prescription choices is affected when the identity of the third-party payer changes. Our case in point 
is the Norwegian market for Tumor Necrosis Factor (TNF) alpha inhibitors (Note
i
).  
When the market for TNF-inhibitors opened in Norway in 2000, the first entrant Enbrel was fully covered by the 
obligatory national insurance plan. The treatment with Enbrel is initiated by the hospital doctor, but the cost was 
automatically covered by the national insurance plan. The second entrant Remicade did not obtain the same type of 
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coverage. Instead, the doctor’s affiliated hospital was held responsible for the treatment cost. Importantly, the hospital’s 
budget did not include earmarked grants for these patients. Cost of treatment with Remicade, therefore, was covered by 
the hospital’s general grant from the government, and as such competed with other expenses within the hospital. This 
sharp asymmetry in funding scheme reflects a quality attribute of the two drugs. Enbrel is administrated by the patients 
themselves (pump injections), while Remicade requires several hours infusion at hospitals. In fall 2002 the government 
modified the plan for Remicade by reducing the hospital’s copayment from 100 to 20 per cent. The remaining 20 per 
cent was still covered the hospital’s general grant, and not by the activity-based scheme (DRG). Enbrel maintained its 
full insurance plan coverage. The third entrant Humira is also administrated by pump injections by patients, and 
received the same funding plan as Enbrel when the drug entered in January 2003. 
The important policy change exploited in our study took place in 2006. Then the asymmetry of financing between 
Enbrel, Humira, and Remicade was removed by returning the entire funding responsibility to the hospitals for all three 
drugs. All drug costs related of treatment with TNF-alpha inhibitors had to be covered by the hospital’s general grant 
(Note
ii). The policy change was based on a claim that the previous scheme created, from the government’s perspectives, 
an unintentional demand response, not related to differences in drug prices (Note
iii
). By transferring the funding 
responsibility for all three drugs to the hospitals, the government aimed at a more neutral scheme with respect to 
doctor’s treatment choices. 
By creating large and exogenous variations in hospital and insurance plan treatment costs, these funding switches 
becomes the crucial source of identification in our empirical  model. To investigate how the different funding plans 
affected price responses among doctors, we have specified a discrete choice model in which the doctor’s choice of 
TNF-alpha inhibitors depends on the prices and the funding schemes. The discrete choice model results in three market 
share equations (the aggregates of multinomial logit probabilities). To account for the possibility that quality aspects, 
including side effects of the drugs, are priced out in the market we have modeled the price setting of the producers, 
derived from a non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium. The markets share equations and the price setting equations are 
estimated jointly on aggregate monthly data. The results show that doctors’ choice of TNF-alpha inhibitor is responsive 
to price differences, and that this price response becomes stronger when hospitals cover the costs.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we relate our paper to the existing literature. Section 3 
presents the econometric model and Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 gives the results and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related Literature  
Our research relates to two strands of the health economics literature. One is the literature on pharmaceutical demand 
and price elasticities. The other is the literature studying the effect of reimbursement schemes on spending. However, 
these two areas of research are interlinked since many of the studies of price responses in pharmaceutical demand 
exploit variations in reimbursement schemes and patient charges.   
Ellison, Cockburn, Griliches, and Hausman (1997) estimate a demand model for a class of anti-infective drugs called 
cephalosporins. Their data contains four different chemical substances, and three of these substances experienced 
significant generic entry in the sample period. In the case of substitution between different substances (therapeutic 
substitution), they find evidence of low (and often insignificant) price responses in demand. Price responses are stronger 
when the choice is between brand-name and generics (generic substitution). One of the drugs comes out with a 
significant own-price elasticity of −0.3. Cephalosporin drugs differ from our TNF-alpha inhibitors by having a 
relatively low level of hospital consumption.  
Berndt, Pindyck, and Azoulay (2003) estimate a demand model for a growing market with competing brand-names 
available. They use data for H2-antagonist antiulcer, and their data starts at the entry of the first patent (Tagament). 
Similar to our study, therefore, they investigate the pharmaceutical demand in a market with several competing 
brand-name (patented) drugs. They develop a rich model that includes a dynamic component of diffusion. Their market 
share model allows the drug choice to depend on prices, in addition to marketing. Doctors’ are found to respond to 
prices, but similar to the findings of Ellison et al. (1997), price responses appear to be relatively low. They find 
own-price elasticities in the range of about −0.3 and −0.6. 
There is a larger literature studying the demand responses to changes in co-payment by patients. A seminal contribution 
was made by Leibowitz, Manning, and Newhouse (1985), who used data from the Rand Health Insurance experiment to 
study the relationship between the degree of cost sharing with patients and prescription drug utilization. They found that 
patients with a more generous insurance scheme buy more prescription drugs. Another early contribution, using 
monthly time-series from the National Health Service (NHS) in England, is O’Brien (1989). He found co-payment 
elasticities in the range of about −0.3 and −0.6. A more recent contribution along this line of research is made by 
Contoyannis, Hurley, Grootendorst, Jung, and Tamblyn (2005). Using micro data (individual patients) from Quebec, 
they estimate the elasticity of expenditure for prescription drugs with respect to patients’ marginal prices (cost sharing). 
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These were found to be relatively low - in the interval −0.12 to −0.16.  
Iizuka (2007) is a recent contribution to the literature on agency problems in the prescription drug market. In the 
Japanese market, doctors make profit from selling prescribed drugs. Using data with both prices and doctors’ own 
mark-up, he estimates a nested logit demand model for the hypertension market, including 40 brands in 5 different 
therapeutic classes. Iizuka finds that prescription decisions are influenced by the size of mark-up, but that doctors care 
more about patient welfare than their own profit. Hence, if the retail price of a brand increases, the doctor becomes less 
likely to prescribe that drug. Other papers studying the importance of doctor and prices in prescription choices are 
Coscelli (2000) and Lundin (2000). The latter study relates to our analysis by showing that doctors’ responses to prices 
are influenced by the funding source. In Lundin’s analysis the two funding sources are the patients themselves or the 
insurance provider. The main contribution of Lundin is to show how the level of patients’ co-payment influences 
doctors choices (between generics and brand-name). He finds that doctors’ are more responsive to patients’ co-payment 
than the cost of the insurance provider. 
Hellerstein (1998) provides evidence of the importance of insurance plans for the agency problem in prescription 
choices. She finds that doctors with a higher fraction HMO-patients (Health Maintenance Organization) relative to 
patients who are enrolled in traditional insurance plans, more often prescribe generics instead of the brand-name drug.  
Because her data did not contain prices, she is not able to study price responsiveness. 
3. Econometric Models  
The decision-making unit on the demand side is the physician, who acts as the patient’s agent (Arrow, 1963). Therefore, 
decision-making-units (DMU) are here represented by physician-patient couples, i=1,.. Nt. 
The model is derived from a random utility model (see Train, 2009 for an overview of such models) in which DMUs 
chooses among the available drugs, j=1,.., J, to maximize utility. 
The number of drugs is three. To this end they are numbered: Enbrel no1, Humira no2 and Remicade no3. The number 
of periods (months) is 62. Our data set include more months. However, capacity problems for the manufacture of Enbrel 
created a lot of noise in the market in the years 2001-2002. To avoid this noise in the data we decided to exclude these 
months in our analysis. 
Utility for the decision-making unit is given by  
 
ijt jt jt jt ijt t
U = - v p a ε ; i=1,2,,,N ; j=1,2,3; t=1,2,,,62 
             
 (1) 
where ait is an indicator of perceived treatment quality of drug j at time t. This is a common quality-indicator that 
applies to all patients that can benefit from TNF-alpha therapy. Like in Berry et al (1995) we will assume that ait 
depends on observed as well as unobserved attributes, which will be specified below.  The unobserved part may reflect 
quality attributes of the three drugs that could be priced out in the market and hence the unobserved parts may correlate 
with prices. This creates estimation problems that will be addressed below. pjt is the price variable associated with drug j 
at time t and vjt are coefficients that capture the impact of the costs of treatment on utility. We have specified the price 
part of the utility function so that a negative impact of price on utility requires vjt to be positive. The random variable εijt 
is iid extreme value.  
The costs of treatment with TNF-alpha inhibitors are covered by a third-party. There are two third-party payers. One is 
the National Insurance Plan (NIS) (termed “I”), and the other is the hospital with which the prescribing doctor is 
affiliated (termed “H”). The funding split between the insurance plan and the hospital varies over time and across drugs: 
At a given time t the drug costs are fully paid by the hospital, fully covered by the insurance plan, or split between the 
two with 80 percent covered by insurance and 20 percent by hospitals.  
Thus, vjt is given by: 
 
jt Ijt I Hjt Hv α β α β ; j=1,2,3                   
 (2) 
Where   
 
 
 
Ijt
Hjt
α 1, 0.8, 0
α 0, 0.2, 1


               
 (3) 
The β-s are coefficients and represent the doctor's responses to drug costs under the different funding plans.  
When the market for TNF-apha inhibitors opened in 2000, Enbrel was fully covered by NIS (i.e. αI1t=1), whereas 
Remicade was covered by the hospitals (αH3t =1). In the fall 2002, the funding of Remicade changed. Hospitals had to 
pay 20 per cent, whereas NIS paid the remaining 80 per cent (αI3t =0.8, αH3t =0.2). When entering in 2003, Humira was 
given the same funding plan as Enbrel, i.e. fully coverage by NIS (αI2t =1). In June 2006, the government then gave the 
full funding responsibility to the hospitals for all three drugs (αHjt =1 for all j.).  
Because hospitals face budget constraints, the hospital’s opportunity costs of drug treatment are strictly positive. 
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Reduced treatment costs may benefit other activities and patients at the same hospital. With coverage by the national 
insurance plan, the direct opportunity cost of the hospital will be zero. Choosing a drug that is fully paid by the 
insurance plan has no impact on the resources available for other activities at the hospital. However, doctors have 
guidelines that instruct them to be cost consciousness in their choices of treatment. Therefore, we expect doctors to be 
price responsive also in the case of insurance plan coverage. But, in the case where the hospital pays the treatment costs, 
we expect doctors to become more concerned about these costs. This might be due to the personal incentives of doctors’ 
to economize on costs in order to be able to spend extra resources on other patients, or just due to the fact that the 
hospital management has stronger incentives to monitor the individual doctor’s treatment choices when these involve 
hospitals own budgets.   
Our hypothesis thus is that (remember that positive coefficients imply a negative impact of price on utility): 
H0 :  bH
  
= bI 
HI :  0 <  bI
   
 <
   
bH 
Because ε
ijt 
is assumed to be independently, identically extreme value distributed across individuals and products, the 
probability that the decision-making unit i will choose drug j at time t is given by the following multinomial logit 
probabilities: 
   jt jt jtijt jt ijt ikt 3
k=1,2,3
kt kt kt
1
exp(-v p a )
φ φ Pr U MaxU = ; j=1,2,3
exp(-v p a )
k

  

               
 (4) 
We choose Enbrel to be the reference product, here denoted product 1, and if we assume there is no outside good whose 
utility can be normalized to zero, these probabilities can be written (Note
 iv)
: 
 
jt 1t jt jt 1t 1t
jt 3
kt 1t kt kt 1t 1t
k=2
1t 3
kt 1t kt kt 1t 1t
k=2
exp(a a (v p v p ))
φ j=2,3; t=1.2....62
1 exp(a a (v p v p ))
1
φ
1 exp(a a (v p v p ))
- - -
- - -
- - -






          
 (5) 
The observed parallel to the average of agents’ probabilities is the market share of the product, mjt. Because we only 
exploit aggregate data, our observed variables will be the market shares.  
The coefficient ajt is assumed to depend on three parts: a deterministic drug-specific constant, αj, a time trend, βjt, and a 
stochastic variable ejt. The deterministic drug-specific constants reflects some unobserved drug-specific elements, while 
the two others may reflect some factors related to doctors’ perception of quality which may change over time and some 
of this is also unobserved.  
This gives us the following log-odd ratios: 
 2t
2 2t 2t 1t 1t 2 2t
1t
m
log = α (v p v p ) β t
m
- - e 
                  
 (6) 
 3t
3 3t 2t 1t 1t 3 3t
1t
m
log = α (v p v p ) β t
m
- - e 
                  
 (7) 
As mentioned in the introduction there are reasons to expect that quality aspects captured by the error terms, e2t and e3t, 
can correlate with prices. The empirical results, given in Section 5, confirm this expectation. We deal with this problem 
by modeling a simultaneous demand and price setting model.  
We assume that each drug provider sets the price on its drug so that expected profit is maximized, given the market 
share equations for the three drugs and the prices set by the other two providers. In this approach we also account for a 
possible correlation between the error terms in the model. This means that in addition to control for quality being priced 
out in the market, we also control for a variety of unobserved heterogeneity. 
The market share equations for all three drugs can be written as: 
 
1t 3
j jt jt 1t 1t j jt
j=2
1
m
1 exp(α (v p v p ) β t )- - e

  
   (8) 
 2 2t 2t 1t 1t 2 2t
2t 3
j jt jt 1t 1t j jt
j=2
exp(α (v p v p ) β t )
m
1 exp(α (v p v p ) β t )
- - e
- - e
 

  
   (9) 
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 3 3t 3t 1t 1t 3 3t
3t 3
j jt jt 1t 1t j jt
j=2
exp(α (v p v p ) β t )
m
1 exp(α (v p v p ) β t )
- - e
- - e
 

  
   (10) 
Note that we have: 
 jt
jt jt jt
jt
m
 v m (1 m ); j=1,2,3
p
- -



   (11) 
Expected profits of the seller of drugs are: 
 
tjt jt jt jtπ (p C )N m-   
 (12) 
Here Cjt are unobserved unit costs. In estimating the model we will assume that Cjt=cjt+ jt , where cjt=cj will be estimated 
below and jt is an unobserved part of the unit cost and/or unobserved factors in the profit maximization process. N t is 
the number of potential customers. 
Maximizing expected profit with respect to price yield the following first order conditions: 
 
jt jt
jt jt
1
p C ; j=1,2,3
v (1 m )
.
-
     (13) 
The econometric model we estimate thus is an equilibrium model. Eqs. (14) and (15) are the demand side of the market, 
while equations (16)-(18) give the supply side in terms of pricing equations. Our conjecture is that βI and βH are positive. 
If the latter is the highest one, funding through hospital budget yields more price-responsiveness than through social 
insurance. Furthermore we expect that correlation across the random terms is such that if there is negative price shock 
in the market for the cheapest and least efficient drug, Remicade, there will be a negative price shock in the market for 
Enbrel. The negative price shock in the Remicade market will cet.par. increase the market share for Remicade. Due to 
the monopolistic competition in the market the producer of Enbrel will respond by cutting its price. But a negative 
correlation in the unobserved parts of market shares of Remicade and Enbrel will cet.par. raise the price of Enbrel and 
thus counteract this price cut. Thus the higher quality drug Enbrel may preserve its market share even with a smaller 
price cut than what the observed part of monopolistic competition predicts. To our knowledge we are the first to model 
econometrically this mechanism.    
 2t 2 2t 2t 1t 1t 2 2t
1t
m
log α (v p v p ) β t e
m
- -      (14) 
 3t 3 3t 3t 1t 1t 3 3t
1t
m
log α (v p v p ) β t e
m
- -      (15) 
 1t 1 1t
1t 1t
1
p c
v (1 m )-
       (16) 
 2t 2 2t
2t 2t
1
p c
v (1 m )-
       (17) 
 3t 3 3t
3t 3t
1
p c
v (1 m )-
   
  
 (18) 
where  
jt Ijt I Hjt H
v α β α β ; j=1,2,3   
We will allow for correlation across the random variables. The correlation structure is the following:  
 
2t 2 2t 2te ρ η μ    
 (19) 
 
3t 3 3t 3t
e ρ η μ 
  
 (20) 
 
1t 12 2t 13 3t 1tη ρ η ρ η μ     
 (21) 
where 
it iμ is normally distributed N(0,σ )  
From (17) and (19) we get: 
 
 2t 2 2t 2 2t2t 2t
1
e ρ p c μ
v 1-m
- -
 
   
 
   (22) 
From (18) and (20) we get 
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 3t 3 3t 3 3t3t 3t
1
ε ρ p c μ
v 1 m
- -
-
 
   
 
   (23) 
And finally we have 
 
   1t 12 2t 2 13 3t 3 1t2t 2t 3t 3t
1 1
η ρ p c - ρ p c μ
v 1-m v 1-m
- - -
   
        
      
 (24) 
The endogenous (stochastic) variables in our model are the market shares and the prices. In order to derive the 
distribution of these variables, given the distribution of the error terms in the previous equations, we have to obtain the 
probability law of the observed random variables, {m1t, m2t, m3t, p1t, p2t, p3t}. Basically this means that we multiply into 
the likelihood of the sample the numerical value of the Jacobian of transformation (see Haavelmo (1944), p 87). The 
Jacobian determinant gives the derivatives of the error terms in each of the 6 equations above with respect to the 6 
observed random variables present in the equations. If the Jacobian determinant explicitly depends on the unknown 
coefficients that we estimate, then it matters for the estimation to include the absolute value of the Jacobian determinant. 
This is the case here. The likelihood that we maximize with respect to the unknown coefficients is given in equation 
(25). In estimating the model the three c-s are assumed to be constant over time.  
As mentioned above our method of estimation is maximum likelihood. The estimates we obtained are those which 
maximises L in equation (25). The second derivatives are used to yield standard errors. 
 
 
 
2t 1t 2 2t 2t 1t 1t 2 2 2t 2t
62
2t 2t
t=1 2 2
3t 1t 3 3t 3t 1t 1t 3 3 3t 3t
3t 3t
3 3
1t 1t
1
1
log(m ) log(m ) α (v p v p ) β t p c
v 1 m1
L f
σ σ
1
log(m ) log(m ) α (v p v p ) β t p c
v 1 m1
f
σ σ
1
p c
v1
f
σ
- - - - - - -
-
- - - - - - -
-
- -
  
    
  
  
 
 
 
  
    
  
  
 
 
 


   
 
 
12 2t 2t 13 3t 3t
1t 1t 2t 2t 3t 3t
1
2t 2t
2t 2t
2 η2
3t 3t
3t 3t
3 η3
t
1 1
p c p c
(1 m ) v 1 m v 1 m
σ
1
p c
v 1 m1
f
σ σ
1
p c
v 1 m1
f
σ σ
J
- - - - -
- - -
- -
-
- -
-


    
        
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

   (25) 
where f(.) is the unit normal probability density and tJ  is the absolute value  of the determinant of the Jacobian given 
by 
 
1t 2t
1t 2t
1t 2t 1t
1t 3t
1t 3t
1t 1t 3t
2 2
1t 1t 1t 1t
2
2t 2t
2
3t 3t
m m 1
v v 0
m m m
m m1
v 0 v
m m m
1 1
1 0 0=
v (1 m ) v (1 m )
1
0 0 1 0
v (1 m )
1
0 0 0 1
v (1 m )
-
-
- -
- -
-
-
-
-


   (26) 
4. Data   
There are three biotechnological drugs acting as tumor necroses factor (TNF) alpha inhibitor in the treatment of 
rheumatoid arthritis (RA). Enbrel (etanercept), is a recombinant protein of human origin. It was approved by the Food 
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and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1998 for the reduction of signs and symptoms of moderate to severe RA, and in 
Europe by European Medicin Agency (EMEA) in 1999. It is administered twice a week by subcutaneous injection. At 
the time of introduction, it was indicated for use by patients who had an inadequate response to one of the other 
disease-modifying anti-rheumatic drugs (DMARD) (Moreland, Baumgartner, & Schiff, 1997). In combination with 
Rheumatrex (methotrexate) clinical trials proved that the addition of etanercept to methotrexate therapy resulted in rapid 
and sustained improvement (Weinblatt, Kremer, Bankhurst, & Bulpitt, 1999). Enbrel gained approval also for the 
treatment of juvenile RA and psoriatic arthritis, and further studies demonstrated its effectiveness as compared with 
methotrexate in patients with early active RA (Bathon, Martin, & Fleischmann, 2000), making it a first-line treatment 
for RA and a leading brand within the new class of DMARDs. Enbrel was developed by Immunex, a biotechnology 
company that in 2001 was acquired by Amgen.  
The second TNF-based RA product on the market is Remicade (infliximab), a chimeric (human and mouse) monoclonal 
antibody that proved to be safe and effective with persistently active RA not responding to methotrexate therapy (Lipsky, 
Van Der Heijde, St Clair, & Furst, 2000). It is marketed by Centocor together with Schering Plough and the Japanese 
company Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma. In Europe EMEA granted marketing authorization in March 2000. It is administered 
every four to eight weeks via an intravenous infusion that may take several hours to complete and requires qualified 
personnel monitoring of adverse reactions. This is considered as a disadvantage in comparison with Enbrel. Nevertheless, 
Remicade progressively increased its sales gaining high market shares. Price of Remicade is lower than Enbrel. 
The third TNF alpha inhibitor in the market is Humira (adalimumab), a fully human monoclonal antibody approved by 
FDA in December 2002 and by EMEA in September 2003, and marketed by Abbott in the form of subcutaneous 
injection every two weeks, setting the drug price in parity with Enbrel. Its attracting dosing profile was considered a key 
success factor, but relatively short after its launch, the growth of sales slowed and it seemed not to threaten significantly 
the market position of its two competitors.  
Market penetration in terms of sales value of these three drugs has been highly successful in Norway. Sale of Enbrel, 
Remicade and Humira accounted for 8 per cent of total pharmaceutical sale in Norway in 2008 (Note
v
). 
The dataset consists of monthly wholesale value and quantity sold, expressed in defined daily doses (DDD), for each of 
the three drugs Enbrel, Remicade and Humira (Note
vi
). The data set covers the months from January 2000 to March 
2008, indicated as running from t=1 to t=99 in Figures 1 and 2. The price per DDD is constructed from combining the 
value and quantity information. Figure 1 shows the monthly wholesale value of sale. 
The market opened early 2000, with the entry of both Enbrel and Remicade. Enbrel had a far stronger growth during the 
first year, and became soon the leading drug. In 2001-2002 Enbrel experienced problems of supplying the global market. 
Worldwide capacity shortage forced the producer to reduce the sale of Enbrel in Norway. This explains the drastic 
reduction in sale value for Enbrel, and its volatility shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Monthly wholesale value of sale; 1000 NOK. As of  Sept 2013 1 Euro=NOK 7.90 
In the fall 2003, the third drug, Humira, entered. Although Humira experienced a steady growth in the fast growing 
market, it never succeeded in capturing a larger market share. Figure 2 shows the development of market shares. 
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Figure 2. Market shares for the three drugs (DDD). 
Within the first year, Enbrel reached a market share of 80 percent. The market share dropped rapidly, most triggered by 
the abovementioned shortage of production capacity. Since Remicade was the only alternative TNF-inhibitor in this 
period, it experiences an equivalent rise in its market share. Humira reached a market share close to 9 percent after a 
few months.   
The price of Enbrel has always been very high relative to Remicade. Except for the first couple of months, the 
wholesale price of Enbrel per DDD stayed between 350 and 400 NOK until late fall 2001. Then the price dropped to a 
level closer to 300 NOK per DDD. Remicade started out with a price of 200 per NOK, but came down to a level 
between 160 and 170 NOK per DDD after a few months. Humira entered with a price much higher than the price of 
Enbrel. Although Humira has kept its position as the price leader, the price gap (compared with Enbrel) has been 
narrowed during the sample period. Figure 3 shows the development of wholesale prices. As mentioned in the 
introduction. Enbrel, Humira and Remicade had different and varying funding schemes over time. 
 
Figure 3. Wholesale price, NOK per DDD. 
We have chosen to restrict the sample period in our empirical analysis to t=38-99 for several reasons. First, there are 
reasons to expect demand behavior – and in particular price responses – to be different in the early stage of a new 
pharmaceutical market compared with the more maturated market. In the early stage, doctors are unfamiliar with the 
particular technology of treatment (TNF-alpha inhibitors) – both its efficiency and its possible side-effects. In a more 
mature market, doctors have gained experience with the drug, and will be better able to make treatment choices for the 
individual patients (see See Berndt et al. (2003)). Gaining experience with TNF-inhibitors, the doctors will be better 
able to take treatment costs into account when choosing between the available alternatives. Second, capacity shortage 
for the manufacture of Enbrel during the first years distorts demand. As seen in this Section, Enbrel experienced a sharp 
decline in sale 2001-2002 that was due to a global capacity problem of the manufacture. After a period of decline, sale 
and market shares were very unstable, until problems were resolved some months before the entry of Humira.  
Applied Economics and Finance                                                                 Vol. 1, No. 1; 2014 
47 
 
Summary statistics for the sample used in estimating our models are provided in Table 1.    
5. Results 
First, we show the estimates of the coefficients  I H 2 32 3,β ,βα ,α , , 
 
when only the demand model is used (Table 2).  
The point estimates imply that βI< βH, but the 95 per cent confidence intervals overlap: lower limit for βI is 0.8581 and 
upper limit is 4.4450, and for βH the lower limit is 2.2627 and the upper limit is 6.7633.  The problem with this 
estimation is that the error terms in the market share equations may be correlated with the prices. There are several 
reasons for this and one is that prices are set by the drug providers so that unobserved quality aspects are priced out. 
When regressing the predicted squared residuals against prices we get significant results which clearly indicate that 
homoscedasticity is rejected. 
Berry et al (1995) recommend that the constants in the equations above should vary across observations and hence 
represent the unobserved quality attributes that may be correlated with price. Next, these coefficients should be 
regressed against prices, or calibrated. The problem in our case with that approach is the high number of constants; here 
equal to the number of observations.  We have therefore chosen to model demand and the price setting of drugs and 
estimate market shares and price setting equations simultaneously. The estimates are given in Table 3. 
Table 1. Summary statistics (62 obs.) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Enbrel:     
DDD 73413.7300 28228.5300 17534.0000 111829.0000 
market share 0.3860 0.0379 0.2802 0.4764 
price 0.2942 0.0136 0.2794 0.3146 
sales  21572.0700 8128.4650 5515.4780 34216.2800 
αH1  0.3548 0.4824 0.0000 1.0000 
αI1 0.6452 0.4824 0.0000 1.0000 
Humira:     
DDD 26143.3400 13833.7300 2014.0000 47531.0000 
market share 0.1278 0.0362 0.0322 0.1720 
price 0.3206 0.0163 0.2935 0.3591 
sales 8206.7740 4197.8050 722.3141 14838.1300 
αH2 0.3548 0.4824 0.0000 1.0000 
αI2 0.6452 0.4824 0.0000 1.0000 
Remicade:     
DDD 88812.0800 30046.7300 43019.0000 159655.0000 
market share 0.4862 0.0651 0.3639 0.6876 
price 0.1608 0.0056 0.1446 0.1743 
sales 14341.7000 5026.1530 6901.8260 26308.0300 
αH3 0.4839 0.3859 0.2000 1.0000 
αI3 0.5161 0.3859 0.0000 0.8000 
Table 2. The demand model 
Coefficients Estimates t-values 
βI 2.652 2.90 
βH 4.513 3.93 
β2 (Humira) 0.014 11.30 
β3 (Remicade -0.011 -4.77 
α2 (Humira) -2.066 -20.49 
α3 (Remicade) 0.587 3.03 
Number of observations 62 
R
2
 (Humira) 0.7476 
R
2
 (Remicade) 0.2351 
Now, the predicted values of the squared residuals in the market share equations do not vary significantly with prices and 
thus homoscedasticity is not rejected. The 95 per cent confidence intervals for the βI and βH do overlap just a little:lower 
limit for βI is 11.018 and the upper limit is 12.2785, and for βH the lower limit is 12.1640 and the upper limit is 13.8808. 
A 90 per cent interval does not overlap: lower limit for βI is 11.1276 and the upper limit is 12.1624, and for βH the lower 
limit is 12.3214 and the upper limit is 13.7266. Based on this model there are some clear evidences that doctors are more 
responsive when the hospitals cover the expenses compared to when national insurance is taking up the bill. 
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In Figure 4 we show the observed development over time of the market shares as well as the prediction based on the 
demand model only and on the model where demand and pricing is estimated jointly. We observe that the latter model 
better predicts the observed development, including the market shares after the reform. In Appendix B we give the 
numbers of observed and predicted market shares over time month by month.   
Table 3. Joint estimates of market shares and price setting  
Coefficents    Estimates t-values 
β I 11.645 37.02 
β H 13.022 30.57 
β 2 (Humira) 1.161 6.46 
β 3 (Remicade) -0.032 -0.08 
α 2 (Humira) -1.635 -13.05 
α 3 (Remicade) -1.340 -4.705 
c1 0.159 36.76 
c2 0.226 66.36 
c3 ~0 ~0 
σ 1 0.010 11.01 
σ 2 0.187 11.01 
σ 3 0.176 4.02 
σ η2 0.017 10.93 
σ η3 0.032 10.56 
ρ 2 3.718 1.93 
ρ 3 -4.901 -1.69 
ρ 12 -0.177 -1.36 
ρ 13 -0.078 -1.025 
Log Likelihood 1055.700  
No of observations 62  
 
Figure 4. Market share a) observed, b) predicted by demand model, c) predicted by joint estimate, from month 38 
(February 2003) to month 99 (March 2008) 
In Appendix A we report the model and the results when the model is extended to deal with autocorrelation in all error 
terms. The estimates of the autoregressive coefficients are all positive, between 0 and 1, and clearly significant. More 
importantly, the estimates of βI and βH do not change much.  
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When autocorrelation is accounted for the trend effects in market shares (β2 and β3) both are insignificant. The drug 
specific constants (α2 and α3) are estimated to be negative (relative to Enbrel). Now both are significant and the 
numerical values become higher, in particular for Remicade. These results indicate that given the price, Enbrel is a 
favored drug in particular compared to Remicade. This accord with the fact that Enbrel yields a more efficient treatment 
and requires less time use for the patient, and with less side effects, than Remicade.   
All unit costs are now significant and almost of the same magnitude as in Table 3, in particular for Enbrel and Humira. 
When accounting for autocorrelation, there is no clear impact on the estimates of the variances of the error terms. 
However, the correlation between the unobserved factors in the market share of Remicade and its price setting is now 
estimated to be significantly negative. Also the correlation between the unobserved factors in the price setting of Enbrel 
and Remicade is estimated to be significantly negative. The first means that if there is negative shock in the price of 
Remicade, then its market share increases, cet.par. The latter estimate implies that a negative price shock for Remicade 
has a positive impact on the prices of Enbrel. However, it should be noticed that due to the observed part in the price 
setting equation for Enbrel a lower price of Remicade implies also a negative price response for Enbrel. This is due to 
the monopolistic competition among the three producers. The negative correlation between the unobserved factors in 
the price setting of Enbrel and Remicade modifies this price response and is obviously due to unobserved quality 
characteristic across the two drugs. The better quality of Enbrel makes it possible to reduce the price less as a response 
to a negative shift in the price of Remicade. This lesser response is here captured by the probabilistic structure of the 
price setting part in the model. 
To further compare the results of the three models we show mean own-price elasticities. These elasticities are the 
elasticities of expected demand with respect to the prices pjt. The elasticities are calculated by applying the following 
expression: 
 jt jt
jt jt jt jt
jt jt
p m
E = = -v p (1-m ); j=1,2,3
m p
ˆ
ˆ


 (27) 
I
Table 4. Mean price elasticities
  The market share model Demand and price setting approach As the previous one, with autocorr. 
Enbrel -0.59                -2.19 -2.34       
Humira -0.92 -3.39 -3.63        
Remicade -0.29 -1.02 -1.09 
We cleary see that when unobserved quality and hence, statistical endogeneity, is controlled for, the numerical value of 
the price elasticities increases. To account for autocorrelation has a negligible impact on the elasticities.  
 
The reason why the elasticities are numerical higher when demand and pricing are estimated jointly is that unobserved 
quality effects absorbed in the random parts of the demand model, and correlated with price, are priced out in the 
market. The joint model with correlation across random terms in the demand equations as well as in the pricing 
equations, account for these market aspects. A more well-known example from another market is that if the demand for 
wine is estimated, lumping all types of wine together, one get low numerical values of demand elasticities. The reason is 
that the model treats high quality wine with a high price the same way as low quality wine with a low price. Again 
unobserved quality of wine, priced out in the market, correlates with price in the demand model, and hence an estimate 
of the demand model only will give biased results. 
In Figure 5 we report the elasticities month by month based on the joint model.   
 
Figure 5. Funding scheme and elasticities  based on the joint estimates of market shares and price setting. 
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6. Conclusions 
We have employed a discrete choice model in which the doctor’s choice among TNF-alpha inhibitors depends on the 
prices. Price response is allowed to vary with the identity of the third-party payer, national insurance and hospitals. The 
estimate of the resulting market share model indicates that homoscedasticity is rejected, which may be due to neglected 
unobserved quality aspects of the drugs which are priced out in the market. The traditional way of dealing with this 
problem is to instrument the prices. We have used another approach. We have modeled the market equilibrium for the 
three drugs. Prices are determined in a non-cooperative Nash – equilibrium. We include correlation between market 
share equations and price setting equations. We also account for autocorrelation by estimating an AR1 model. The 
equilibrium model is estimated in a joint maximum likelihood approach.  
We find that doctors are significantly more responsive when the costs are covered by the hospitals compared to when 
costs are covered by national, public insurance. Moreover, the numerical values of the own-price elasticities increase 
substantially when a market share model is replaced by a market equilibrium model. 
An interesting result emerges due to the estimated correlation structure of the model. The correlation between the 
unobserved factors in the market share of Remicade (the less expensive and less efficient treatment) and its price setting 
is estimated to be significantly negative. This implies that if there is negative shock in the price of Remicade, then its 
market share increases, cet.par.. Due to the observed part of the price setting in the monopolistic competition model the 
producer of Enbrel (and also of Humira) respond by cutting prices. However, the correlation between the unobserved 
factors in the price-setting of Enbrel (the more expensive and more efficient treatment) and of Remicade is estimated to 
be significantly negative. This negative correlation between the unobserved factors in the price setting of Enbrel and 
Remicade therefore modifies the price response due to the observed part of price-setting and is obviously due to 
unobserved quality characteristc across the two drugs. The better quality of Enbrel makes it possible to reduce the price 
less as a response to a negative shift in the price of Remicade. This lesser response is here captured by the probabilistic 
structure of the price-setting part of the model. To our knowledge we are the first to model and estimate this outcome of 
an equilibrium model.  
The policy implication of our finding is that the funding schemes of expensive drugs matter with respect to the costs to 
the society of using drugs with more or less similar treatment effects but with marked price differentials. In Norway a 
reform was introduced in 2006 transferring the funding responsibility for all drugs from social insurance to hospitals. 
This made the prescribing doctors more cost conscious and implied a more neutral scheme with respect to treatment 
choices. In many of the members of EU, with Italy as an exception, the funding scheme is social insurance. Our results 
indicate that to put the funding inside the hospital budgets may lower the costs of using TNF-alpha inhibitors.     
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Appendix A. The market model extended to deal with autocorrelation. 
To simplify notation let 2t 3t
2t 3t
1t 1t
log m log m
Y , Y
log m log m
  , and let rj, j=2,3,4,5,6 be the coefficients that capture the possible 
correlation over time between the error terms in the equations (14)-(18).  
For instance e2t=r2 e2t-1+ e*2t, where * indicate the new error terms after assuming a first order autoregressive scheme. 
The equivalent to equations (14)-(18) is then  
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where as before 
jt Ijt I Hjt H
v α β α β ; i=1,2,3   
The likelihood now becomes  
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where f(.) is the unit normal probability density and tJ  is the absolute value of the same determinant of the Jacobian as 
before. The estimates are given in Table A.1.  
Table A.1. Joint estimates of market shares and price setting, accounting for autocorrelation.  
Coefficents    Estimates t-values 
β I 12.842 7.75 
β H 13.368 7.86 
β 2 (Humira) 0.556 1.68 
β 3 (Remicade) 0.836 0.95 
α 2 (Humira) -2.400 -2.51 
α 3 (Remicade) -8.868 -0.91 
c1 0.167 10.27 
c2 0.223 17.47 
c3 0.111 2.69 
σ 1 0.007 10.74 
σ 2 0.129 9.51 
σ 3 0.104 8.03 
σ η2 0.005 10.51 
σ η3 0.018 6.83 
ρ 2 3.649 0.88 
ρ 3 -10.040 -7.94 
ρ 12 -0.048 -0.25 
ρ 13 -0.299 -5.26 
r2 0.691 7.60 
r3 0.890 17.18 
r4 0.664 6.36 
r5 0.878 24.34 
r6 0.662 2.87 
Log Likelihood 1225.700  
No of observations 62  
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Appendix B. Market share observed and predicted by different models 
Table B.1. Monthly market share: observed, predicted by the demand model, and predicted by joint model 
Year month 
number 
month observed predicted:demand model predicted: joint model 
    Embrel Humira Remicade Embrel Humira Remicade Embrel Humira Remicade 
2003 38 February 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.35 0.07 0.58 0.27 0.06 0.68 
  39 March 0.35 0.00 0.65 0.37 0.07 0.56 0.40 0.06 0.54 
  40 April 0.36 0.00 0.64 0.36 0.07 0.57 0.35 0.05 0.59 
  41 May 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.36 0.07 0.57 0.36 0.06 0.59 
  42 June 0.39 0.00 0.61 0.37 0.07 0.56 0.35 0.05 0.60 
  43 July 0.35 0.00 0.65 0.37 0.07 0.56 0.40 0.07 0.54 
  44 August 0.41 0.00 0.59 0.38 0.07 0.55 0.39 0.06 0.54 
  45 September 0.35 0.05 0.60 0.38 0.07 0.55 0.42 0.06 0.52 
  46 October 0.32 0.11 0.57 0.38 0.08 0.54 0.39 0.07 0.53 
  47 November 0.33 0.12 0.55 0.38 0.09 0.54 0.41 0.09 0.51 
  48 December 0.37 0.14 0.49 0.38 0.09 0.53 0.42 0.09 0.49 
2004 49 January 0.36 0.16 0.48 0.38 0.09 0.54 0.35 0.08 0.57 
  50 February 0.39 0.15 0.46 0.38 0.09 0.53 0.40 0.09 0.52 
  51 March 0.38 0.16 0.46 0.39 0.09 0.52 0.41 0.09 0.50 
  52 April 0.32 0.16 0.52 0.39 0.09 0.52 0.42 0.09 0.49 
  53 May 0.36 0.15 0.49 0.39 0.10 0.52 0.40 0.09 0.51 
  54 June 0.40 0.15 0.45 0.38 0.10 0.51 0.43 0.14 0.44 
  55 July 0.38 0.20 0.42 0.38 0.11 0.51 0.41 0.13 0.46 
  56 August 0.38 0.17 0.45 0.38 0.11 0.51 0.38 0.13 0.49 
  57 September 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.38 0.11 0.51 0.38 0.13 0.49 
  58 October 0.41 0.16 0.43 0.38 0.11 0.51 0.38 0.13 0.50 
  59 November 0.42 0.15 0.43 0.39 0.11 0.50 0.38 0.13 0.49 
  60 December 0.44 0.16 0.40 0.39 0.11 0.50 0.39 0.14 0.47 
2005 61 January 0.43 0.15 0.43 0.39 0.12 0.50 0.34 0.12 0.53 
  62 February 0.45 0.16 0.40 0.39 0.12 0.49 0.36 0.13 0.51 
  63 March 0.40 0.17 0.43 0.39 0.12 0.49 0.37 0.13 0.50 
  64 April 0.39 0.16 0.45 0.39 0.12 0.49 0.36 0.13 0.51 
  65 May 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.40 0.12 0.48 0.39 0.14 0.47 
  66 June 0.41 0.17 0.42 0.40 0.13 0.47 0.39 0.14 0.47 
  67 July 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.40 0.13 0.47 0.39 0.14 0.46 
  68 August 0.43 0.17 0.40 0.40 0.13 0.47 0.38 0.14 0.47 
  69 September 0.41 0.19 0.40 0.40 0.13 0.46 0.39 0.15 0.47 
  70 October 0.42 0.21 0.37 0.40 0.14 0.46 0.38 0.15 0.47 
  71 November 0.44 0.21 0.35 0.40 0.14 0.46 0.39 0.15 0.46 
  72 December 0.41 0.21 0.39 0.41 0.14 0.45 0.40 0.15 0.44 
2006 73 January 0.39 0.22 0.38 0.40 0.14 0.45 0.34 0.14 0.52 
  74 February 0.40 0.22 0.37 0.41 0.15 0.45 0.39 0.15 0.46 
  75 March 0.40 0.22 0.38 0.41 0.15 0.44 0.38 0.15 0.47 
  76 April 0.40 0.24 0.36 0.41 0.15 0.44 0.38 0.15 0.47 
  77 May 0.41 0.23 0.36 0.41 0.15 0.43 0.39 0.15 0.46 
  78 June 0.38 0.24 0.38 0.36 0.13 0.51 0.37 0.14 0.48 
  79 July 0.38 0.26 0.36 0.36 0.14 0.50 0.37 0.15 0.48 
  80 August 0.39 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.14 0.50 0.37 0.14 0.49 
  81 September 0.38 0.27 0.35 0.37 0.14 0.49 0.37 0.15 0.48 
  82 October 0.39 0.26 0.35 0.37 0.14 0.49 0.37 0.15 0.48 
  83 November 0.37 0.27 0.35 0.37 0.14 0.49 0.36 0.15 0.49 
  84 December 0.40 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.15 0.48 0.37 0.15 0.48 
2007 85 January 0.36 0.27 0.37 0.37 0.15 0.48 0.36 0.15 0.49 
  86 February 0.37 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.15 0.48 0.35 0.15 0.50 
  87 March 0.37 0.27 0.36 0.39 0.15 0.46 0.43 0.15 0.43 
  88 April 0.36 0.27 0.36 0.39 0.15 0.45 0.43 0.15 0.43 
  89 May 0.38 0.28 0.34 0.40 0.16 0.45 0.42 0.15 0.43 
  90 June 0.37 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.16 0.44 0.42 0.15 0.43 
  91 July 0.36 0.30 0.34 0.40 0.16 0.44 0.42 0.15 0.43 
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  92 August 0.37 0.29 0.34 0.40 0.16 0.44 0.42 0.15 0.43 
  93 September 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.17 0.43 0.42 0.15 0.43 
  94 October 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.40 0.17 0.43 0.41 0.15 0.44 
  95 November 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.40 0.17 0.43 0.42 0.16 0.43 
  96 December 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.40 0.18 0.42 0.41 0.16 0.43 
2008 97 January 0.33 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.19 0.41 0.39 0.18 0.43 
  98 February 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.40 0.20 0.41 0.40 0.19 0.42 
  99 March 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.19 0.42 
 
 
                                                        
Notes 
Note
i
. To date TNF-alpha inhibitors represent the most important way to treat arthritis and other autoimmune diseases 
(Feldmann & Maini, 2003). 
Note
ii
. With the change of the funding scheme in 2006, Remicade was given a fee-for-service to compensate for the 
need for in-hospital infusion of the drug. Importantly, although Enbrel and Humira is administered by the patient and 
delivered by local pharmacies, the prescrpition choices are always made by doctors affiliated with the hospitals. 
Note
iii
. According to the government’s budget proposal presented to the Parliament (Stortinget) September 30, 2005. 
The general grant to hospitals was increased to compensate for the increased drug costs related to these drugs.  
Note
iv
. Unfortunately, we are not able to construct an outside option to treatment with one of the three therapies. This 
would require a record of all patients with these diagnoses – including those without medical treatment. Our model, 
therefore, assumes that variations in prices covered by hospitals or the insurance schemes only affects the allocation of 
patients on different therapies (drugs), and not the total number of patients treated.   
Note
v
. Norwegian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers. Facts and Figures (2009). 
Note
vi
. The data set is provided by Farmastat, a company owned by Norwegian Association of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers. 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. 
 
